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Evolutionary dynamics of N-person 
Hawk-Dove games
Wei Chen1, Carlos Gracia-Lázaro2, Zhiwu Li1,3, Long Wang4 & Yamir Moreno2,5,6
In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource 
often requires the cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of 
the Hawk-Dove Game for an arbitrary number of agents: the N-person Hawk-Dove Game. In this model, 
doves exemplify the cooperative behavior without intraspecies conflict, while hawks represent the 
aggressive behavior. In the absence of hawks, doves share the resource equally and avoid conflict, but 
having hawks around lead to doves escaping without fighting. Conversely, hawks fight for the resource 
at the cost of getting injured. Nevertheless, if doves are present in sufficient number to expel the 
hawks, they can aggregate to protect the resource, and thus avoid being plundered by hawks. We derive 
and numerically solve an exact equation for the evolution of the system in both finite and infinite well-
mixed populations, finding the conditions for stable coexistence between both species. Furthermore, 
by varying the different parameters, we found a scenario of bifurcations that leads the system from 
dominating hawks and coexistence to bi-stability, multiple interior equilibria and dominating doves.
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is concerned with populations of agents allowed to act strategically in the inter-
actions among them1, 2. As a way to model the fitness, the reproductive success of agents depends on the payoff 
obtained in the interactions, which in turn depends on the strategies of the interacting agents. EGT provides 
a theoretical framework to model Darwinian competition that has been widely used to study evolving popu-
lations of lifeforms in biology and, particularly, for the study of cooperative behavior in animals3–7, and more 
explicitly, among humans8–10. In this context, most of the research has focused on two-person games11 such as 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma12–15, the Stag Hunt16 and the Hawk-Dove Game (HDG)17, 18, which describe conflict-
ing situations where some individuals profit from selfishness to the detriment of others. From these games, the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma reproduces the worst possible scenario for cooperation, in which an agent always gets the 
highest individual benefit by not cooperating. The Stag Hunt is a coordination game that describes a conflict 
between safety and cooperation: while the greatest benefit for both agents is obtained when both cooperate, 
cooperation implies a risk, because cooperating against a non cooperative agent provides the lowest benefit. The 
HDG is an anti-coordination game with two possible strategies: cooperation or defection. While the best strategy 
against a cooperator is defection, the highest cost is paid by defecting against a defector.
The above games or dilemmas have greatly contributed, despite their simplifications, to a better understanding 
of what could be plausible mechanisms for the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior. However, 
many real-life situations involve collective decisions made by a group, rather than by only two individuals. In gen-
eral, group interactions cannot be generated by means of pairwise interactions, among other reasons, due to the 
indirect linkage of players through the participation in groups19. In this sense, Public Goods Game (PGG) capture 
situations in which some individuals (free-riders) can benefit from other ones (cooperators) without paying any 
cost, that is, without suffering the decrease of fitness associated with the production of the common good20. In 
the classical PGG, the contributions of cooperators to a common pool are enhanced and equally shared among 
cooperators and defectors, regardless their contribution21.
In addition to the PGG, there is a large set of possible multi-agent situations that can be addressed through 
other games. In this regard, the Snowdrift Game (SG) is a model of conflict in which there is a task to be done. 
The basis underlying the conflict is that defectors benefit from cooperators without paying a cost for doing the 
task, but without cooperators the task would not be accomplished22. When only two individuals are involved, 
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the situation is described by the standard SG. In this case, both agents are faced with a common task. There are 
three possible outcomes: i) No one cooperates, and hence the task is not achieved with the consequent damage to 
each one. ii) Both individuals cooperate, and both benefit, sharing the work associated with the task. iii) If only 
one individual cooperates, both benefit from the task done despite the fact that the cooperator has paid the entire 
cost associated to the task4. If the benefit is greater than the cost, the ordering of payoffs coincides with that of 
the HDG. This means that in the case of only two individuals involved, both HDG and SG are equivalent. When 
more than two agents are involved, the conflict underlying the Snowdrift problem can be addressed through 
an N-person generalization of the standard SG23. The N-person SG considers a sample consisting of N agents 
and a task to be done. Every agent, regardless of whether he contributes to the task or not, will receive a fixed 
benefit if the task is performed by one or more agents within the sample. The total cost of performing the task 
is equally shared among those who perform it (the cooperators), while the defectors benefit without paying any 
cost24–28. On the other hand, the situation in the Hawk-Dove problem is of a very different nature compared to 
that underlying the Snowdrift. In the Hawk-Dove problem there is not a task to be done, but a resource suscepti-
ble to be shared. While in the Snowdrift problem every individual benefits from the task, if accomplished, in the 
Hawk-Dove problem only a kind of strategists (cooperators or defectors) benefits from the resource, excluding 
the opponent strategists from the distribution17, 18, 29, 30. This different nature materializes when there are more 
than two individuals involved; in this general case, the mathematical formulation differs drastically between both 
situations, which call for a new approach to deal with the Hawk-Dove problem for many individuals.
Here, we propose a generalization of HDG for N agents, hereafter N-person HDG, with the aim of analyzing 
how the dynamics is affected when considering group interactions. In the N-person HDG, two kinds of strat-
egists (hawks and doves) compete for a resource R. While hawks are willing to fight to get the whole resource, 
doves wish to share the resource equally, refusing the resource rather than fighting for it. Accordingly, when a 
set of individuals face a resource, the hawks fight among them, paying a cost cH, while doves retreat. Only in the 
case that there are no hawks competing for the resource, the doves will share it. The fitness of the individuals is 
determined by their payoff when getting involved in an N-person HDG. We study analytically the evolution of 
cooperative behavior within the framework of the replicator dynamics1, 31, by considering either a very large or 
an infinite population of hawks and doves. We derive an exact equation for the evolution of the fraction of doves 
in a well-mixed population, which can be solved numerically as a function of the parameters. We first study the 
infinite population size limit, and show the existence of a critical value for the hawks’ cost cH above which coop-
eration is sustainable: while for values of cH, hawks and doves coexist in the stationary state, for lower values of cH 
the dynamics leads to the extinction of the doves, resulting in a population of only hawk strategists.
Furthermore, as a refinement of the model, we consider the situation in which the doves aggregate to defend 
the resource, not at all cost, but only in the case they are present in sufficient number to expel the hawks, i.e., 
there is a minimum threshold T that assures them to succeed. In that case, after expelling the hawks, paying a cost 
cD for it, doves share the resource without fighting among themselves. Otherwise, i.e., if the number of doves is 
below the threshold, they retreat and the hawks fight among themselves. It is worth noticing that although both 
hawks and doves can fight, a hawk will fight in any situation (unless all his opponents flee), while doves only fight 
against opposite strategists, and provided they are allowed to expel them. This refinement of the model, hereafter 
N-person HDG with threshold (HDG-T), captures the stress between gregarious and asocial behaviors. We show 
that, depending on the values of the parameters, the dynamics drives the system towards either one of the absorb-
ing mono-strategic states (all hawks or all doves), or towards an interior equilibrium in which both strategies 
coexist. Subsequently, we study the dynamics in finite populations, finding results compatible with those obtained 
for the infinite size limit.
Results
Preliminary concepts. As mentioned earlier, the standard HDG is a two-player-two-strategies game that 
captures a conflict of interests in which the most advantageous strategy is the opposite to that of the opponent. 
There are two possible strategies, namely, hawkish behavior (H), that represents fighting, and dove behavior (D), 
that represents sharing. When faced with a common resource R, two doves equally share the resource obtaining 
each one R/2, while two hawks fight for it, paying a cost c that represents the damage caused by the fight, and 
therefore obtaining each one (R − c)/2. If a hawk meets a dove, the hawk obtains the whole resource R, while the 
dove retreats and gets nothing. The game can be expressed by means of its payoff matrix, where rows represent 
focal player’s strategies, columns represent opponent’s strategies, and the corresponding matrix element is the 
payoff received by the focal player:
N-person HDG. The model we present here constitutes a generalization of the two-person HDG to an 
N-person game. Assume a sample of size N ≥ 2 with two kinds of strategists, the aggressive ones – like the hawks, 
and the cooperators – the doves. Let R be a resource such as food or water. As pointed out before, when the pop-
ulation is made up by all doves, they share the resource equally avoiding conflict. If doves meet hawks, all doves 
escape without fighting, while the remaining hawks fight for the resource paying a given cost. Their respective 
payoffs are:
Hawks’Payoff:
strategy H D
H (R − c)/2 R
D 0 R/2
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where nH and nD represent the numbers of hawks and doves in the sample, respectively, and cH the cost of injury. 
Thus, (nH − 1)cH represents the total injury suffered by all the hawks. It should be noted that doves only get payoffs 
when there are no hawks in the sample. For N = 2, the model recovers the standard two-person HDG. In order to 
study the effect of cost and sample size and composition, R is conventionally assumed to be 1.
Let be a population of size Z, from which groups of size N are randomly sampled; let nH and nD denote the 
numbers of hawks and doves in the sample respectively, N = nH + nD. As a first approach to the problem, consider 
a very large population Z → ∞, composed of a fraction x of doves (x = nD/N), the rest (1 − x) being hawks. Social 
interactions take place in sample groups of size N, which are randomly selected from the whole population. The 
average fitness of hawks fH(x) and doves fD(x) is determined according to a binomial sampling, as shown in the 
methods section. We study the population dynamics in terms of the replicator Equation1, according to which the 
time evolution of x is given by:
= −x x f x f x( ( ) ( ) ), (3)D
where x represents the gradient of selection and 〈f(x)〉 stands for the average fitness of the whole population.
Figure 1(a) shows the gradient of selection x as a function of the density x of doves, for different values of cH 
and a simple size of N = 5. As shown, for a small cost (cH = 0.1), the gradient of selection is always negative and 
doves fail to survive regardless of any initial condition. Nevertheless, as the internal conflict among the hawks 
grows, and with it its associated cost cH, there appears a critical value, beyond which an internal equilibrium point 
indicates the coexistence of doves and hawks in the steady state. Furthermore, setting fD(x) = fH(x) and x = 0, the 
minimum value of cH for stable equilibrium to survive is ccv = R/(N − 1), being ccv the critical value. Figure 1(b) 
shows the fraction of doves ⁎x  in the equilibrium as a function of the cost cH, for different sample sizes N. As 
shown, the equilibrium fraction of doves increases with increasing cost of hawks and increasing sample size. The 
latter follows from the fact that the greater the sample size, the greater the number of hawks involved in the fight. 
In general, a higher competition of hawks (either due to an increase in sample size or to an increase in hawks’ 
cost) entails a decrease in their average fitness, and thus the equilibrium frequency of doves increases. As cH > ccv 
implies >⁎x 0, it follows that ccv determines the value for the transition from a mono-species state to 
coexistence.
Figure 1. Gradient of selection and equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in infinite populations. (a) 
Gradient of selection x in the N-person HDG as a function of the frequency x of doves, for a sample size of 
N = 5. Different colors stand for different costs cH = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. Circles represent the interior attractors 
indicating the coexistence of hawks and doves in the steady state. (b) Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove 
Game in infinite populations for different values of cost cH. x* represents the equilibrium fraction of doves in 
the population. There is a critical value ccv = 1/(N − 1) for the cost cH beyond which hawks and doves coexist. 
The resource is taken as unity R = 1. See the main text for further details.
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At this point, let us assume a finite population of size Z, composed by k doves and (Z − k) hawks. As in the 
case of infinite populations, interactions take place in sample groups of size N, but in this case the mean fitness 
of hawks and doves is determined in accordance with a multivariate hypergeometric sampling, see the section 
Methods. Regarding the dynamics, we assume a stochastic birth-death process driven by a pairwise Fermi-like 
rule32. According to this rule, at each time step, two individuals (u, v) are randomly selected. The probability that 
a descendant of v replaces u is given by an increasing function of the payoff difference:
=
+ − −
p
exp w f f
1
1 [ ( )]
,
(4)u v
where the inverse temperature w controls the noise. Low (high) w represents high (low) noise and, correspond-
ingly, weak (strong) selection pressure. w → 0 leads to a probabilistic choice while w → ∞ and fu > fv lead to the 
deterministic imitation dynamics.
Figure 2(a) shows the gradient of selection G(k) describing the evolutionary dynamics of N-person HDG in 
finite populations as a function of the fraction of doves k/Z, for different population sizes Z and costs cH and a 
sample size of N = 5. It should be noted that, for finite populations, the fraction of doves k/Z is not a continuous 
variable, but a discrete one. It is shown that, as in the previously discussed case of infinite populations, for a small 
cost cH the gradient of selection is always negative G(k) < 0, and therefore doves become extinct, regardless of 
their initial fraction in the population. For higher cost values cH, there exists a unique internal root k* making 
G(k) = 0. Therefore, a stable equilibrium arises with increasing cH and doves are promoted. In addition, both the 
gradient of selection G(k) and the internal stable equilibrium k* increase slightly as the group size Z increases, 
which implies that large populations facilitate the advantage of doves. Figure 2(b) depicts the equilibrium frac-
tions of doves as a function of the cost cH, for different sample sizes N and a fixed population size Z = 100. Note 
that these results are compatible with those obtained for finite populations. Thus, when increasing cH, the regime 
in which the hawks dominate changes to a regime in which both species coexist. Moreover, increasing the sample 
size enhances the fitness of doves and, consequently, less hawks’ cost cH is required for the existence of doves.
N-person HDG-T. In the above described N-person HDG, doves are assumed to be non-aggressive. As a 
refinement of the model, now we assume that doves can aggregate to protect the resource and thus avoid being 
plundered by hawks. This situation is very common in nature, where animals such as buffaloes aggregate to fight 
against predators. In this revised model, N-person HDG-T, we assume a threshold T. If the fraction of doves 
exceeds or equals the threshold (nD/N ≥ T), the doves expel the hawks, paying a cost cD for it, and then share the 
resource equally without fighting among themselves. Otherwise, if the number of doves is below the threshold 
(ND/N < T), doves retreat and hawks fight among themselves for the resource. The respective payoffs of doves and 
hawks in the N-person HDG-T are:
Hawks’payoff:
Figure 2. Gradient of selection and equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in finite populations. (a) 
Gradient of selection G(k) in the N-person HDG as a function of the discrete fraction k/Z of doves, for different 
population sizes Z and a sample size of N = 5. Different shapes of symbols represent different population 
sizes Z = 10, 20, 100, while solid (resp., empty) symbols represent a cost of cH = 0.1 (resp., 0.5). (b) Equilibria 
of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game in finite populations for different values of cost cH, and a population size 
of Z = 100. Symbols denote the required values of cH for which there exists an equilibrium at k/Z. Note that, 
for finite populations, k/Z takes discrete values. Different symbols represent different sample sizes N. Other 
parameters are R = 1, w = 1.
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where nH (resp., nD) stands for the number of hawks (resp., doves) in the sample of size N, cD for the cost of doves 
to protect the resource from being plundering by hawks, and cH for the cost of injury within hawks. Notice, once 
again, the different nature of both costs: while cH refers to intra-specific competition, cD refers to an interspecific 
(intergroup) conflict cost. For T = 1 the previous N-person HDG model is recovered.
As in the previous model, for the case of a very large population (Z → ∞) the population dynamics is studied 
according to the replicator equation. Figure 3 represents the frequency of doves in the equilibrium x* for different 
thresholds and costs in the limit of an infinite population. Upper panels show how the intra-specific conflict cost 
of hawks cH impacts the evolution of doves for different thresholds T = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and for different fixed 
values of doves’ cost cD. As shown in panel (a), when the threshold is small (T = 0.2), indicating that doves are 
more resourceful in intergroup competition, a slight cost of doves (cD = 0.2) drives the population to evolve into 
a full-dove state and no interior equilibrium exists. When cD is increased, an unstable equilibrium emerges and 
divides the system into two basins of attraction regardless of cH. Both full-dove state and full-hawk state can be 
reached from different initial conditions: for an initial frequency of doves x0 > x*, the hawks vanish (fD > fH), but 
for x0 < x*, the doves are the ones that vanish (fD < fH), indicating that both absorbing states are stable equilibria 
and the proposed game is transformed into a coordination game. Panels (b–d) show the behavior for greater 
thresholds T > 0.2. In these cases, for a small cH, an interior unstable equilibrium appears, whose value decreases 
for larger cH, indicating that increasing cH enlarges the basin of attraction of the full-dove steady state. With fur-
ther increasing cH, multiple interior equilibria can occur and a new stable equilibrium emerges. Finally, for even 
higher values of cH, both unstable and stable equilibria converge to a saddle-node bifurcation beyond which the 
dynamics always leads to a full-dove state.
Bottom panels of Figure 3 show the effects of the intergroup conflict cost of doves cD. When the threshold is 
small (T = 0.2), as shown in panel (e), x* = 1 is the only steady state for low values of cD, which means that the 
Figure 3. Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game with threshold in infinite populations. Fraction of 
doves x* at the equilibrium for a sample size of N = 5. Solid (resp., dashed) line corresponds to stable (resp., 
unstable) equilibrium. Top panels represent x* as a function of the hawks’ cost cH. Different color lines stand 
for different doves’ costs: red, blue and gray lines represent cD = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 respectively. The bottom panels 
represent x* as a function of the doves’ cost cD. Different color lines stand for different hawks’ costs: red, blue 
and gray lines represent cH = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 respectively. Shaded areas denote a negative gradient of selection. (a,e), 
(b,f), (c,g) and (d,h) panels correspond to thresholds T = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 respectively. The resource is taken as 
unity R = 1. See the main text for further details.
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dynamics always leads to a full-dove state regardless of the initial condition. With the increase of cD, an unstable 
equilibrium appears and the dynamics changes from dominating doves to bi-stability. However, for cH = 0.8, a 
saddle-node bifurcation emerges as cD is increased, but the stable equilibrium only exists for a very small range 
of values of cD, resulting in a transcritical bifurcation that leads to bi-stability. Panels (f–h) show the behavior 
for greater thresholds T > 0.2. In these cases, a small cH leads to an interior unstable equilibrium, while a large 
cH results in the domination of doves. Yet for a moderate cH, multiple interior equilibria including an unstable 
equilibrium and a stable equilibrium drive the system to either the domination of doves or the coexistence of both 
species under different initial conditions.
Figure 4 shows a natural classification of the dynamics of N-person HDG-T that depicts three basic phase 
regimes. The condition that favors hawks is met when − − <P N P N( ) ( 1) 0D H , indicating that a single hawk in 
a group of N − 1 doves is better off than a dove in a full-dove group. For T = 1 this condition becomes 
− − = − <P N P N R N R( ) ( 1) / 0D H , which is always met, and hawks do not vanish (shown in Figure 1(b)). 
Besides, the condition for a successful invasion of doves is obtained when a single dove in a group of N − 1 hawks 
has a higher income than a full hawkish group, namely, − >P P(1) (0) 0D H . For T = 1/N this condition becomes 
− + >c Nc R 0H D , see the red line in Figure 4(a). Below this line, multiple interior equilibria are found – though 
in a narrow region –, as well as a full-dove state. However, for ≥T N2/ , one gets that > −c R N/( 1)H  from the 
relation − >P P(1) (0) 0D H , which provides a condition for the emergence of stable equilibria. Results in Figure 4 
highlight the possible transitions between three different phases as a function of the costs and the threshold T. 
Consequently, both increasing cH and decreasing cD facilitate the fixation of the doves in the population.
Figure 4. Phase diagrams for the N-person Hawk-Dove Game with threshold. Diagrams show the different 
regimes in the N-person HDG-T for a sample size of N = 5 and an infinite population. Different panels 
correspond to different thresholds T = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 respectively. Within the bi-stability regime both full-dove 
state and full-hawk state can be reached from different initial conditions, while the bi-stability + stability regime 
corresponds to coexistence state together with full-dove state. In the doves regime the dynamics always leads to 
a full-dove state. The resource is taken R = 1.
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Furthermore, T also has critical effects on the evolutionary dynamics. For instance, by increasing it, one can 
find regions where dominating doves give rise to bi-stability, and other changes such as from multiple interior 
equilibria to dominating doves, or from bi-stability to multiple interior equilibria and even to dominating doves. 
Additionally, increasing T suppresses doves even for a small cH, while there is an optimal T that facilitates doves. 
For > −c R N/( 1)H , increasing T not only strengthens the intergroup competitiveness of doves – there are less 
hawks to fight with, thus, the cost is smaller – when ≥n N T/D , but also weakens the in-group competitiveness of 
hawks, since the decrease in the maximum number of hawks to win over doves results in less in-group injury 
when >n N T/H . As a consequence, an optimal T is found to promote doves. Particularly, for ≤ −c R N/( 1)H , 
the payoff of a single dove in a group of N − 1 hawks is lower than the payoff of a hawk in a full hawkish group 
since − >P P(1) (0) 0D H , and therefore doves are suppressed. On the other hand, a small cH enhances the compet-
itiveness of hawks in intergroup conflict. As a consequence, increasing T reduces the in-group conflict of hawks 
and finally favors hawks. Regarding the effects of sample size, regardless of costs, increasing N suppresses doves 
for T = 1/N, since the basin of attraction of the hawkish state increases, whereas doves are favored for T = 1 since 
stable equilibrium increases. This behavior is mainly attributed to the impact of sample size on in-group compe-
tition and resource allocation, benefiting the incomes of victorious agents from the reduced reduction.
As for finite populations, Figure 5 shows the equilibrium fraction of doves k*/Z as a function of the costs cH 
and cD, for different sample sizes N and a fixed population size Z = 100. The interior roots of G(k), varying with 
different costs and thresholds, are presented when the roots exist. These results are very similar to those corre-
sponding to infinite populations shown in Figure 3. Particularly, since successful invasions can be directly 
obtained from PD(k) and PH(k), which are independent of binomial or hypergeometric samplings, the phase dia-
grams are extremely similar to those corresponding to infinite populations shown in Figure 4. We have also 
explored the effects of threshold and sample size, which in finite populations are not qualitatively different from 
those reported before for infinite populations. Moreover, by exploring the stationary distribution of doves, it is 
also found that both increasing cH and decreasing cD promote doves. Finally, although the equilibrium points 
show a small dependence on the population size Z, it vanishes as Z grows, finding that for sufficiently high values 
of Z the dynamics is independent of the population size, which means that for large enough populations 
( ≥Z N/ 100) the infinite population limit is a fair approximation that captures the dynamics of the system.
Discussion
In summary, this work proposes a general framework of multi-player Hawk-Dove game that generalizes the 
traditional symmetric two-person Hawk-Dove game. Two different kinds of species, denoted as hawks and doves 
respectively, represent the competition to survive of hawkish and cooperative behaviors through group interac-
tions. The hawkish behavior, a more competitive trait, wins intergroup conflict, but also bears the cost associated 
Figure 5. Equilibria of the N-person Hawk-Dove Game with threshold in finite populations. Fraction of doves 
k*/Z in the equilibrium as a function of the hawks’ cost cH (top) and doves’ cost cD (bottom), for a sample size 
of N = 5 in a finite population of size Z = 100. Solid (dashed) points represent stable (bistable) points, whereas 
dashed lines mark the regions beyond which fD > fH and below which fD < fH. In top panels, different colored 
symbols represent different doves’ costs: red, blue and gray lines correspond to cD = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, respectively. 
In the bottom panels, red, blue and gray symbols represent hawks’ costs cH = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, respectively. Other 
parameters are R = 1, w = 1.
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with intra-group conflict, whereas the cooperative behavior, overcoming intra-species conflict, may lose in inter-
species conflict unless the fraction of doves exceeds a threshold T. By implementing the proposed model in 
well-mixed infinite and finite populations, we found that increasing the intra-group competition cost of hawks, 
as well as decreasing the intergroup competition cost of doves, promotes the evolution of doves. Furthermore, the 
threshold plays a key role in the model. As T decreases from T = 1, the phase regimes changes from dominating 
hawks and stability to bi-stability, multiple interior equilibria and dominating doves. Specially, if the intra-group 
competition cost of hawks is greater than R/(N − 1), an optimal threshold is found to optimize doves, otherwise 
increasing threshold suppresses them.
Although two-person Hawk-Dove Games can mathematically be regarded as a Snowdrift Game, this equiv-
alence breaks down when generalizing it to N persons. An N-person Snowdrift Game characterizes real-world 
situations in which a task needs to be done by cooperating, with the consequent benefit for the group, whereas 
the proposed model describes the competition for a resource between two species. The N-person Hawk-Dove 
here presented thus conceptualizes the dilemma that being an aggressive type can reward from interspecies com-
petition but also incurs a high cost in terms of intra-species conflict, while cooperators aggregate and share the 
resource. We also hypothesize that, if the present model were to be applied to a real context in nature, the thresh-
old needed for successful preservation of the doves type would be very high. Indeed, a high threshold is more 
realistic than the assumptions on which either doves obtain nothing unless no hawks are in the group or a low 
threshold that implies a fiercer intra-species conflict. Furthermore, group interactions can not be regarded as a 
set of independent pairwise encounters. Finally, we mention that in previous studies of a two-person Hawk-Dove 
Game, both an heterogeneous topology and different update rules have been proven to have an impact on coop-
eration29, 30. It would thus be of further interest to explore how such factors change our findings for N-person 
hawk-dove games, and therefore gain more insights into our current understanding of cooperative behavior in 
social dilemmas.
Methods
Evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations. Consider a very large well-mixed population Z → ∞, 
composed of a fraction x of doves and a fraction (1 − x) of hawks. Sample groups of size N are randomly selected 
from the population. Following a binomial sampling33, the mean fitness of hawks in the population is given by:
∑= − −
=
−
− −( )f x N i x x P i( ) 1 (1 ) ( ), (7)H i
N
i N i
H
0
1
1
whereas the average fitness of doves is:
∑= − − + .
=
−
− −( )f x N i x x P i( ) 1 (1 ) ( 1) (8)D i
N
i N i
D
0
1
1
The time evolution of x is given by the replicator Equation1:
= −
= − + −
= − −
x x f x f x
x f x xf x x f x
x x f x f x
( ( ) ( ) )
( ( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )))
(1 )( ( ) ( )), (9)
D
D D H
D H
where 〈f(x)〉 represents the average fitness of the whole population. From this equation, it follows that the equi-
libria satisfy:
− = .⁎ ⁎f x f x( ) ( ) 0 (10)D H
As an illustrative example, let us consider the case T = N, corresponding to the N-person HDG. According to 
Equations (1 and 7), the mean fitness of hawks is given by:
=
+ −
−
−f x R c x
N x
c( ) ( )(1 )
(1 )
,
(11)H
H
N
H
while from Equations (2 and 8) it follows that the mean fitness of doves is:
= .
−
f x Rx
N
( ) (12)D
N 1
Hence, we get:
− =
+ − + − −
−
−
f x f x c x Rx Nc x Nc R c
N x
( ) ( )
(1 )
,
(13)D H
H
N N
H H H
1
and the replicator Equation (9) can be written as:
= + − + − −−x x
N
c x Rx Nc x Nc R c( ) (14)H
N N
H H H
1
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Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations. In this subsection, we address the evolutionary dynamics 
of N-person HDG in finite populations of size Z. Unlike the case of infinite populations, where sampling followed 
a binomial distribution, the groups in finite populations are given by a multivariate hypergeometric sampling34, 35. 
Let k be the number of doves in the total population. Accordingly, the number of hawks will be Z − k. Now, the 
fraction of doves (k/Z) is not a continuous variable, but a discrete one. The average fitness of hawks is thus given by:
∑=
− −
− −
−
−
=
− ( )
( )
( )
f k
k
i
Z k
N i
Z
N
P i( )
1
1
1
1
( ),
(15)
H
i
N
H
0
1
whereas the average fitness of doves is:
∑=
− −
− −
−
−
+ .
=
− ( )
( )
( )
f k
k
i
Z k
N i
Z
N
P i( )
1
1
1
1
( 1)
(16)
D
i
N
D
0
1
Assuming the Fermi-like rule32, at each elementary time step two individuals are chosen at random from the 
population. If they are of different species, then the probabilities that a dove replaces a hawk, and the opposite 
scenario, are given, respectively, as
=
+ − −→
p
exp w f k f k
1
1 [ ( ( ) ( ))]
,
(17)D H D H
and
=
+ − −
.→p exp w f k f k
1
1 [ ( ( ) ( ))] (18)H D H D
Consequently, the probabilities that the finite population increases (T+) or decreases (T−) by one dove are ref. 36:
=
−
+
±
−
T k k
Z
Z k
Z e
( ) 1
1
,
(19)w f k f k( ( ) ( ))D H
and therefore, the gradient of selection in finite populations is given by:
= − =
− 

 −



+ −G k T k T k k
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Z k
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